VI. CHINESE NEO-COLONIALISM

VI. CHINESE NEO-COLONIALISM

VI. CHINESE NEO-COLONIALISM

A. Mutual Unequal

Africa is changing. Sub-Saharan Africa is urbanizing at the world’s fastest rate.¹⁷³ No issue is more central to the ongoing conversation about Africa’s development than Sino-African relations.¹⁷⁴ Given the decades-long slide of economic decline in some African regions, China’s appeal is readily apparent.¹⁷⁵ China’s

¹⁷⁰ Helal, supra note 166.

¹⁷¹ Id at 51.

¹⁷² Ryan, supra note 168, at 288.

¹⁷³ John Campbell, Africa is the Fastest Urbanizing Place on the Planet, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/blog/africa-fastest-urbanizing-place-planet.

¹⁷⁴ MUNYARADZI MAWERE & COSTAIN TANDI , “A New Form of Imperialism?” Interrogating China-Africa Relations and Development Prospects in Africa, in DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES FROM THE SOUTH: TROUBLING THE METRICS OF [UNDER-] DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 393, 393 ( Munyaradzi Mawere ed., 2016).

¹⁷⁵ NDUBISI OBIORAH ET. AL., “Peaceful Rise” and Human Rights: China’s Expanding Relations with Nigeria, in CHINA INTO AFRICA: TRADE, AID, AND INFLUENCE 292 (Robert I. Rotberg ed., 2008); see also DAVID SHINN & JOSHUA EISENMAN, A Historical Overview of China-Africa Relations, in CHINA AND AFRICA: A CENTURY OF ENGAGEMENT 17 (2012) (describing that trade was the

supporters claim its interests in Africa are apolitical and businessoriented, with a proven track record of generating economic growth without creating aid dependency. Additionally, some African intellectuals welcome China’s involvement on the continent as a marker heralding a return to a multipolar world in which Africa will have a bigger role to play.¹⁷⁶ The reality is that China’s strategy is self-referential and neo-colonial with strategic economic asymmetries and a failure or unwillingness to condemn oppressive African governments.¹⁷⁷ In this view, “[t]he interest of China in Africa is highly suspicious … it is a relationship that should be handled with caution especially by the African governments … [because] it mirrors the Euro-African relationship during Europe’s colonial adventures in Africa.”¹⁷⁸

Colonialism, in its raw form, is a socio-political ecosystem predicated on the subordination of certain association members while granting the colonizers prerogatives denied to the colonized.¹⁷⁹ China continues to benefit more from Africa than Africa does from China. However, it is wrong to say that the evolution of the Sino-Africa relationship is one-way, with passive Africa responding to Chinese overtures. After all, African people and governments initiated contact and sought relations with China before independence.¹⁸⁰ Further, post-independence leaders such as Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere and Zambia’s Kenneth Kaunda looked to China as a model for domestic economic nation building.¹⁸¹ In the 1960s and 1970s, China’s relations with African nations were often driven by domestic African considerations, as China fashioned itself for those audiences into a plausible alternative to both the West and

first link between China and Africa. Egypt’s famed Queen Cleopatra reportedly wore silks that probably originated in China.)

¹⁷⁶ Obiorah, supra note 175, at 289.

¹⁷⁷ Mawere & Tandi, supra note 174, at 393.

¹⁷⁸ Id. at 401 (discussing how other scholars hold China’s actions are more altruistic and opine China’s good relations with Africa are the fruit of persuasion rather than the heavy-handed approach of either Western colonialism or Western-directed financial practices).

¹⁷⁹ Lea Ypi, What’s Wrong with Colonialism, 41 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 158, 162 (2013); E. Tendayi Achiume, Migration As Decolonization, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1509, 1534 (2019).

¹⁸⁰ Obiorah, supra note 175, at 273.

¹⁸¹ Id.

the Soviet Union.¹⁸² In the 1980s, during the waning years of the Cold War, China continued to position itself as an alternative, this time to the “Washington Consensus” and the devastating structural adjustment programs sometimes foisted upon Africa. The SinoAfrica relationship entered a new phase in the 1990s with significant consequences for both sides. China saw Africa as a land of possibility for growing recognition of its status as a global power, while Africa understood China as a wellspring of economic investment.¹⁸³ In 2000, China and Africa created the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) to serve as a method for promoting cooperation and shared interests.¹⁸⁴ That same year, Beijing hosted a ministerial conference, the first of its kind in the history of Sino-Africa relations.¹⁸⁵ The conference drew over five thousand attendees and approximately eighty ministers of foreign affairs, international trade, and economic cooperation from fortyfour African countries.¹⁸⁶ China’s interest in Africa continued apace; 2006 was dubbed “China’s Year of Africa.”¹⁸⁷ Bucking global trends, China took a risk and did not shy away from investment in Africa during the global financial crisis of 2008.¹⁸⁸ More recently, Chinese investment in Africa has extended to mergers and acquisitions and to the expansion of Chinese-owned manufacturing operations on the continent.¹⁸⁹ Today China’s veneer in Africa wears thin; there is little doubt it is exporting cheap, low grade products to Africa, especially in certain markets like textiles and electronic goods.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸² Herbert Jauch, *Chinese Investments in Africa: Twenty-First Century Colonialism?, *20 NEW LABOR FORUM 49, 49-55 (2011).

¹⁸³ Mawere & Tandi, supra note 174, at 400.

¹⁸⁴ Uche Ewelukwa Ofodile, Trade, Empires, and Subjects-China-Africa Trade: A New Fair Trade Arrangement, or the Third Scramble for Africa?, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 505, 508 (2008)

¹⁸⁵ *Id. *

¹⁸⁶ Id.

¹⁸⁷ Id. at 507.

¹⁸⁸ Miria Pigato & Wenxia Tang, China and Africa: Expanding Economic Ties in an Evolving Global Context, WORLD BANK (Mar. 2015), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/21788/951610W P00PUBL050March01600PUBLIC0.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.

¹⁸⁹ Id.

¹⁹⁰ Mawere & Tandi, supra note 174, at 407.

Africans continue to express a range of reactions to Chinese engagement. Generally, leaders and governments tend to portray Beijing in a positive light and point to tangible improvements in public works projects that benefit ordinary people engaged in daily life.¹⁹¹ After decades of European colonial dominance, followed by more decades of Western aid and investment provided under paternalistic guises, some African leaders have shown appreciation for China’s “no strings attached” approach.¹⁹² Recently, China’s socialist market economy, driven by state-owned enterprises, is more brazenly geared toward securing sufficient energy, resources, and minerals to feed its domestic and international industrialization programs.¹⁹³ In 2008-2009, the African Labor Research Network (ALRN) performed a ten-country study (Angola, Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) and found evidence of a neo-colonialist system, whereby China profited to the detriment of African economic systems.¹⁹⁴The relationship, which began more egalitarian, is now unequal. For this reason, greater numbers of African workers increasingly refer to “Chinese businesspeople … [as] the new colonizers.”¹⁹⁵ Importantly, some African leaders are taking an increasingly pessimistic tone and warn that the unfavorable economic and commercial engagement with China will end badly.¹⁹⁶ Michael Sata, the fifth President of Zambia from 2011 to his death in 2014, ran campaigns in 2006 and 2011 focused on the social and economic dangers of African weakness relative to China.¹⁹⁷ President Sata’s fears were prescient: Zambia, Africa’s third-largest economy, is currently reeling from extensive Chinese debt, with Beijing playing hardball and looking to restructure agreements that may involve mining assets as collateral.¹⁹⁸ One

¹⁹¹ LARRY HANUER & LYLE MORRIS, African Reactions to Chinese Engagement, in CHINESE ENGAGEMENT IN AFRICA: DRIVERS, REACTIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 55 (2014).

¹⁹² Id. at 57.

¹⁹³ Jauch, supra 182.

¹⁹⁴ Id.

¹⁹⁵ Id.

¹⁹⁶ Hanuuer & Morris, supra note 191, at 55.

¹⁹⁷ Id.

¹⁹⁸ Elliot Smith, Zambia’s spiraling debt offers glimpse into the future of Chinese loan financing in Africa, CNBC (Jan. 14, 2020),

South African commentator who has seen China’s activities on the continent up close thinks China’s primary goal with foreign investment is geopolitical, not economic. The problem is ripe for exploitation because the investments tend to bind African countries politically to China while creating debt obligations and leverage that China can manipulate to force nations to support Chinese global ambitions.¹⁹⁹

B. China in Latin America

Modern Latin America is a diverse region, a land of contrasts. Brazil is massive, occupying half the South American continent with a population greater than 200 million.²⁰⁰ Mexico boasts the next highest population at nearly 120 million while Colombia, Argentina, Peru, and Venezuela constitute smaller nations with populations between 30 and 50 million.201 Trade between China and South America is growing exponentially, but this often involves exchanging short-term economic gains for long-term

https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/14/zambias-spiraling-debt-and-the-future-ofchinese-loan-financing-in-africa.html. It is noteworthy that in 2017, the Chinese media conglomerate StarTimes funded the creation of a migration to a new digital TV signal and now controls 60% of a joint digital venture with ZNBC. Id.

¹⁹⁹ Panos Mourdoukoutas, What China Wants From Africa? Everything, FORBES (May 4, 2019, 9:48 AM), (quoting Ted Bauman, Senior Research Analyst at Banyan Hill Publishing), https://www.forbes.com/sites/panosmourdoukoutas/2019/05/04/what-chinawants-from-africa-everything/#7bb5e070758b .

²⁰⁰ Population, Total - Brazil, THE WORLD BANK, (last visited Feb. 11, 2021), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=BR.

²⁰¹ Population, total - Mexico, THE WORLD BANK, (last visited Feb. 11, 2021), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=MX.; Population, Total - Colombia, *THE WORLD BANK, (last visited Feb. 11, 2021), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=CO.; *Population, Total - Argentina, *THE WORLD BANK, (last visited Feb. 11, 2021), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=AR.; *Population, Total - Peru, THE WORLD BANK, (last visited Feb. 11, 2021), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=PE.; Population, Total- Venezuela, RB, THE WORLD BANK, (last visited Feb. 11, 2021), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=VE.

dependency.²⁰² Some estimates claim that China will be the dominant trading partner in Latin America by 2050.²⁰³ President Xi Jinping indicated that the next step in China’s development is transforming its economy from a labor-intensive export model to one in which medium and high-skill exports are coupled with growing material imports to China’s megacities.²⁰⁴ Latin America is poised to help China pivot away from its current producer-exporter status because its population of nearly 600 million can support economic industrialization and serve as a base for Chinese goods.²⁰⁵ At a meeting between China and 33 members of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said the region was a natural fit for the BRI, as the U.S. has taken a more proactive stance in the last few years.²⁰⁶ Chile’s Foreign Minister Heraldo Munoz said that China’s relationship with CELAC marks the beginning of a “historic” dialogue that represents a categoric repudiation of protectionism and unilateralism.²⁰⁷ Chinese banks (China Development Bank and China Export-Import Bank) are the largest lenders in Latin America.²⁰⁸ Accumulated loans totaled $137 billion from 2005 to

²⁰² Krishnadev Calamur, Tillerson to Latin America: Beware of China, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 3, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/02/rex-inlatam/552197/.

²⁰³ R. Evan Ellis, *The Future of Latin America and the Caribbean in the Context of the Rise of China, *CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, 3, (Nov. 2018). https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/publication/181119_FutureofLatinAmerica.pdf?fMECdCfwt7zdU7MyR9OFme08CFXWHti.

²⁰⁴Seth Cropsey, “China Sets Its Sights on South America, HUDSON INSTITUTE, (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.hudson.org/research/14249-china-sets-its-sights-onsouth-america

²⁰⁵*Id. *

²⁰⁶ China Invites Latin America to Take Part in One Belt, One Road, CNBC (Jan. 22, 2018, 9:38 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/22/china-invites-latinamerica-to-take-part-in-one-belt-one-road.html.

²⁰⁷* Id. *

²⁰⁸ Mark P. Sullivan & Thomas Lum, China’s Engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 2, (last updated Nov. 12, 2020), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10982.

2019 with Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador, and Argentina rounding out the top recipients.²⁰⁹

Positive impacts to some Latin American economies are coming at a prohibitive cost in terms of Chinese neo-colonialist exploitation.”²¹⁰ For countries like Brazil, a former Portuguese colony, Beijing is an alternative to Washington’s benign neglect but the increase of Chinese manufactured goods in the Brazilian market is concerning to government officials because the real to yuan currency difference makes it more difficult for Brazilian national production to compete with cheaper products from China. China has spent billions of dollars in Latin America in the past fifteen years, mostly in the form of loans to regional governments for a variety of projects.²¹¹ Trade between China and Latin America surged from $12 billion in 2000 to almost $306 billion in 2018.²¹² The loans have transparency issues and have all the appearance of debt traps.²¹³ China’s growing imprimatur on Latin America can be seen in other chilling instances. In Quito, Ecuador, Chinese-made CCTV cameras with facial recognition technology are likely being used for surveillance and intelligence gathering purposes.²¹⁴ The Venezuelan government now relies on Chinese technology for its “fatherland card,” a type of identity document human rights activists fear will be used to infringe on privacy. Most of all, China’s exploitation of the region’s natural resources is leading to environmental concerns about pollution and harm to residents and livelihoods.²¹⁵ Chinese companies do not have high environmental standards and labor rights are not considered; “[f]or Chinese companies, the community is not a valid interlocutor, only the government is. The different is

²⁰⁹ Id.

²¹⁰ Angela Piedad Suárez Torres, China and Latin America, From NeoColonialism to Interdependence? The Case of Brazil, 16 DIMENSIÓN EMPRESARIAL 1, 3 (2018).

²¹¹ Matt Rivers, Pandemic Power Play: It’s China vs. the US in Latin America, CNN (Aug. 15 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/08/15/americas/latam-chinaus-covid-diplomacy-intl/index.html

²¹² Raquel Carvalho, China in Latin America: partner or predator, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (May 25, 2019), https://multimedia.scmp.com/weekasia/article/3011618/beijing-conquest-latin-america/index.html.

²¹³ Id.

²¹⁴ Id.

²¹⁵ Carvalho, supra note 212.

that gringo imperialism deals with civil society, the Chinese don’t … They don’t try to understand where they are … And they consider that social peace is not their problem.”²¹⁶ As Taish Mercedes, a sixty-five-year-old member of the Shuar minority, an indigenous group living in Ecuador and Peru, explained her feelings when a Chinese-backed mining project bulldozed her home in the Ecuadorean region of the Amazon basin: “[o]ur motherland can provide us with everything. That is our way of life. But the colonisers came and taught people how to live with money. … Now the Chinese are the new colonisers – just like the ones before. They are ruining the harmony of our land.”²¹⁷

Washington’s repeated warning to Latin America to be wary of becoming too economically reliant on China is not having the desired effect of driving Beijing from the region.²¹⁸ The reasons are fairly straightforward from a Latin-centric public-relations perspective: while the U.S. government imposed a more stringent tariff regime on Latin American countries, demanded Mexico pay for a border wall, put undocumented workers at risk for deportation, and proposed cuts to U.S. aid, China exerted itself and lent many helping hands to the region. Kevin Gallagher, a China-Latin America relations professor at Boston University, summed up the dichotomy which has practical, real-world consequences: “Literally and figuratively, the [U.S.] is building walls against Latin America . . . . The Chinese are proposing to build bridges, and they’re actually doing it.”²¹⁹ Nonetheless, a Chinese long-term victory in Latin America is not inevitable. The U.S. has closer cultural, political, and economic ties with several major nations in the region than does China.²²⁰ U.S. companies, ranging from Chevron to

²¹⁶ Id.

²¹⁷ Id.

²¹⁸ Cassandra Garrison, With U.S. Hit by Virus, China Courts Latin America with Medical Diplomacy, REUTERS (Mar. 26, 2020, 1:38 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-latam-china-featur/withu-s-hit-by-virus-china-courts-latin-america-with-medical-diplomacyidUSKBN21D346.

²¹⁹ Patrick Gillespie, China Sees an Opening as Trump Loses Confidence of Latin America, CNN (Feb. 9, 2020), https://money.cnn.com/2018/02/09/news/economy/china-latin-americatrump/index.html.

²²⁰ Id.

McDonald’s, have a substantial presence and are actively collaborating with governments on myriad investment projects.²²¹ Speaking the language of post-colonial uplift, former U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said that China’s presence in Latin America is alarming because the region “does not need new imperial powers that seek only to benefit their own people.”²²² The U.S. needs to be far more adept at message branding and curtail divisive language: President Trump threatened to cut off aid to Latin America if they cannot prevent drugs from coming into the U.S., he added, quite unnecessarily “[t]hese countries are not our friends, you know.”²²³

C. Medical Diplomacy

During her virtual speech at the Republican National Committee, Nikki Haley, the former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, was characteristically blunt in her assessment of Beijing’s responsibility for Covid-19: “Communist China gave us the coronavirus.”²²⁴ This is not China’s first time getting blamed for its poor response to infectious diseases. During the 2002 and 2003 SARs crisis, China hid cases, censored doctors and withheld information from the world for months.²²⁵ In December 2019, patients at Wuhan hospitals had pneumonia symptoms that were not responsive to treatment. Doctors quickly sent samples for genetic testing and the results revealed a coronavirus similar to SARs; these same doctors warned the virus was contagious via respiratory

²²¹ Id.; see also Raymond Dua Jr., The Rise of Chinese Technology in Latin America, GLOBAL AMERICANS (Aug. 12, 2020), https://theglobalamericans.org/2020/08/the-rise-of-chinese-technology-in-latinamerica/.

²²² Gillespie, supra note 219.

²²³ Id.

²²⁴ Gavin Bade, Trump’s Tough Talk on China Faces Harsh Trade Realities, POLITICO (Aug. 27, 2020, 5:24 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/08/27/trump-tough-on-china-trade403890.

²²⁵ Carrie Gracie, China is Rewriting the Facts About Covid-19 to Suit its Own Narrative, THE GUARDIAN (July 27, 2020, 4:43 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/jul/27/china-truthcoronavirus-panorama-xi-jinping.

droplets and on surfaces.²²⁶ Thereafter, the Chinese government stepped in. The story about a virulent infection rate was downplayed in Wuhan and Beijing. Frontline doctors tried to speak up and warn each other on social media but were silenced.²²⁷ In late December, Dr. Li Wenliang, a courageous whistleblower, was detained by the police for warning about the virus and “spreading false rumors.”²²⁸ He was forced to sign a false official statement admitting to violating the law and seriously disrupting “social order.”²²⁹ Soon after Dr. Wenliang’s death from the virus, the news of his passing was the most read topic on Weibo, China’s microblogging site with more than 1.5 billion views.²³⁰ Predictably, the intense public interest in Dr. Wenliang’s death soon caught the attention and ire of the CCP. Soon thereafter, the National Supervisory Commission, China’s most powerful anti-corruption agency issued a chilling one-sentence on their website: investigators will be sent to Wuhan to conduct “a comprehensive investigation into the problems reported by the public concerning Dr. Wenliang.²³¹

Despite multiple layers of culpability for COVID-19, China determined its most important fight is a public relations battle.²³² In the main, China’s strategy is to pivot away from stories about COVID-19’s genesis in Wuhan and the subsequent coverup perpetrated by CCP officials and promote headlines supporting that China is on the frontlines saving humanity.²³³ Lin Songtian, China’s ambassador to South Africa tweeted: “We are doing instead of talking. We are the friends not enemy. Could the American do the same to Chinese?”²³⁴ It is no accident that a heat map of where

²²⁶ Id.

²²⁷ Id.

²²⁸ Verna Yu, ‘Hero Who Told the Truth’: Chinese Rage Over Coronavirus Death of Whistleblower Doctor, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 7, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/feb/07/coronaviruschinese-rage-death-whistleblower-doctor-li-wenliang.

²²⁹Id.

²³⁰ Id.

²³¹ Id.

²³² Matthew Karnitsching, China is Winning the Coronavirus Propaganda War, POLITICO (Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.politico.eu/article/coronavirus-chinawinning-propaganda-war/.

²³² Id.

²³⁴ Id.

Beijing is sending condolences and medical supplies aligns closely with nations with a demonstrated willingness to accommodate China.²³⁵ Fake news, misleading spin, obfuscation, concealment, and hyperbole are hallmarks of the CCP’s coronavirus propaganda.²³⁶ Unlike Russia, with its acrimonious information operations and election meddling, China’s global propaganda efforts are usually aimed at promoting China’s virtues.²³⁷ From Beijing’s perspective, the contest is not about who gets to run the U.S. but rather the world.²³⁸ Russia is a second-rate power in its own region. It is an economically sluggish, oil-dependent nation with an economy one tenth the size of the U.S. China, by contrast, possesses an economy poised to overtake that of the U.S. and has sunk billions of dollars into cultivating global dependence on Chinese investments and markets.¹³⁹ As the global pandemic worsened, Beijing went into propaganda crisis mode. Chinese diplomats, staterun media, and Twitter influencers doubled-down and launched a frenzied defense, scrambling to preserve the CCP’s cratering reputation both domestically and internationally.¹⁴⁰ Meanwhile, during the time China ramped up its messaging, the U.S. paused funding to the United Nations’ World Health Organization (WHO).²⁴¹ U.S. allies were stunned by President Trump’s announcement.²⁴² President Trump shot back his rationale: the WHO willingly participated in a Chinese-directed cover-up about the virus.²⁴³ As the U.S. appeared disinterested in leading a global response, China continued its ostentatious pledges of cash to the WHO and vowed to provide any vaccine discoveries China makes

²³⁵ Id.

²³⁶ Kathy Gilsinan, How China is Planning to Win Back the World, THE ATLANTIC (May 28, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/05/china-disinformationpropaganda-united-states-xi-jinping/612085/.

²³⁷ Id.

²³⁸ Gilsinan, supra note 236.

²³⁹ Id.

²⁴⁰Id.

²⁴¹ Alex Brandon, Trump’s WHO Cutoff Sends Officials, allies Scrambling, POLITICO (April 15, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/04/15/worldhealth-organization-trump-funding-cuts-187615.

²⁴² Id.

²⁴³ Id.

to the world as a public good.²⁴⁴ On July 7, 2020, President Trump started the process to withdraw the U.S. from the WHO.²⁴⁵ The Geneva-based organization, a leader in the fight against myriad diseases in the Americas, ranging from polio, measles to mental health issues and COVID-19, receives approximately $400 million in annual U.S. contributions.²⁴⁶ As the U.S. turned inward to respond to its own coronavirus crisis, “[f]rom Santiago, Chile to Mexico City and everywhere in between, America’s leadership is being called into question and China is positioning itself to carry the mantle.”²⁴⁷ China carefully crafted its messaging to Latin America throughout its coronavirus response and is reaping strategic returns. On April 13, 2020, Argentina’s foreign minister thanked China for providing a large shipment of much-needed medical supplies. The aid boxes were emblazoned with the Chinese and Argentine flags and a quote in Spanish about brotherhood from the renown Argentine poem “El Gaucho Martín Fierro” by José Hernández.²⁴⁸

Latin America became the epicenter of the pandemic during the late summer of 2020.²⁴⁹ Multiple leaders including Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, Honduran President Juan Hernandez, Dominican Republic President Luis Abinader, and Bolivia’s unelected de facto leader, Jeanine Añez, alongside half of her cabinet, all contracted the virus.²⁵⁰ The difference between the U.S. and Chinese approach to the outbreak in Latin America is striking. The U.S. suspended shipments of personal protective equipment

²⁴⁴ Id.

²⁴⁵ Shaun Tandon, Ignoring Outrage, Trump Officially Pulls US out of WHO during Virus Crisis, SCIENCE ALERT (July 8, 2020), https://www.sciencealert.com/trump-formally-starts-process-to-pull-us-out-ofwho.

²⁴⁶ Id.

²⁴⁷ Paul Angelo & Rebecca Chaves, ‘Gracias China!!!’ While the U.S. Leadership in Latin America is Being Called Into Question, Beijing is Positioning Itself to Carry the Mantle, NY TIMES (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/21/opinion/china-latin-america-covid.html.

²⁴⁸ Id.

²⁴⁹ Michael Paarlberg, China was Already Winning Over the US’s Beighbors. Trump’s COVID-19 Response Just Makes Beijing’s Job Easier, BUSINESS INSIDER (Aug. 27, 2020, 11:19 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/trumpcovid-19-response-increases-chinese-influence-in-latin-america-2020-8.

²⁵⁰Id.

while China announced $1 billion in loans to nations in the region to help pay for a vaccine China says it will develop.²⁵¹ China also donated hundreds of thousands of masks, testing kits numbering in the tens of thousands, as well as ventilators and other medical equipment.²⁵² China’s tactics appear to be working and Brazil is a case in point. President Bolsonaro ran on an anti-China platform and blamed China for the virus’ spread. However, after Brazil faced the second worst outbreak in the world, Bolsonaro reconciled with Beijing, an about-face almost certainly spurred by Brazil’s power agribusiness interests, which know China is a customer they cannot afford to alienate.²⁵³

Beijing retained the initiative and took proactive steps each time COVID-19 swept through a new nation. From Mexico to Argentina and Peru, nations accepted China’s offers of support.²⁵⁴ At times, leaders even broadcasted enthusiastic and grateful messages to China. “Gracias China!!!,” gushed Mexico’s foreign minister Marcelo Ebrard on Twitter after a plane containing vital medical supplies arrived from China.²⁵⁵ Not one to waste a political moment, China amped up its rhetoric about brotherhood in the face of crisis. As Luo Zhaohui, a senior officer at China’s foreign ministry declared, “China will ride out the storm with people from other countries, strengthen cooperation and strive to win the last victory in the fight against the virus.”²⁵⁶ China’s strategic moves appear to be gaining traction. While U.S. officials were criticized for the unhelpful branding of COVID-19 as the “Chinese virus,” Beijing acknowledged the continued gratitude and praise coming from Latin America.²⁵⁷